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## A Stocktaking of the UN-IFI Relationship on Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2018–2020

### About the author

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In 2018, the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank published a groundbreaking report driven by the conviction that the international community's attention must urgently be rebalanced from crisis response to prevention. *Pathways for Peace* offered a joint framework for conflict prevention, and as it has gathered momentum, other international financial institutions (IFIs)—such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—have re-examined their approach to fragile and conflict-affected countries from their own institutional perspectives.

Fast forward to fall 2020, and we face a very uncertain global picture due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In a rapid and massive way, governments the world over are facing macroeconomic and fiscal crises at the same time that they must mobilize and respond to COVID-19. Economies are contracting as the response to the pandemic requires diverting resources to social services. The UN and the IFIs have mobilized massively to respond while also dealing with a radically changed environment in which priorities are shifting day by day.

The UN and the Bank were already moving to operationalize preventive approaches at the country level. The overhaul proposed by *Pathways for Peace* (P4P)—which called for a shift towards more agile and integrated approaches to prevention and away from a fragmented, siloed, and technical approach—will be sorely tested in the upcoming period. The sense of urgency created by COVID-19 pushes entities towards moving quickly; however, it risks reliance on familiar mechanisms, thus reinforcing rather than bridging silos.

A key message of this summary is that it will take great effort now to ensure that the much-needed response to COVID-19 takes a preventive approach in the most fragile and conflict-affected countries. Before the pandemic, there was good and increasing coordination at project level in many countries, but operationalization of the preventive approach foreseen in P4P needed a higher level of ambition. This ambition should be provided by the implementation of the World Bank's first-ever Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) strategy, released in March 2020, and the growing partnership between the Bank and the UN as the latter implements systemic reforms.

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The response to COVID-19 has created new opportunities for multi-partner collaboration

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There is a risk that these opportunities will be overshadowed by the colossal need generated by COVID-19. At the same time, the response to COVID-19 has created new opportunities for multi-partner collaboration. Because of COVID-19, planning cycles are suddenly aligned—it is happening now. Could this offer a “make or break” moment, and will the approach to COVID-19 response and recovery be risk-informed? The FCV strategy is an enormous opportunity to build back better, in line with the UN secretary-general’s vision for prevention.

In the immediate period, proponents of the preventive approach should be watching to see whether the collective responses of the UN and the IFIs attempt to mitigate underlying FCV drivers—especially in countries we already know to be vulnerable—or whether they exacerbate existing inequalities and grievances by pouring new money down old channels, forgetting P4P’s insights.

This briefing provides an external perspective on the evolution of the UN-IFI relationship over the past three years. Given the catalytic effect of P4P, the first part of the stocktaking will focus on the UN-World Bank relationship, followed by a brief overview of partnership with the IMF. We then assess challenges and opportunities. It is written for a broad audience—across the UN system, the World Bank and other IFIs, UN member states, civil society, and beyond—and aims to build consensus on next steps needed to accelerate implementation of a preventive approach, focusing on:

- Leveraging complementary approaches
- Agreeing on the most urgent prevention priorities and leveraging the new FCV envelope in IDA19
- Empowering prevention champions at national and international levels
- Creating convening platforms at national level
- Strengthening structural relationships

### **The UN-World Bank relationship, 2018 to 2020: From P4P to the FCV Strategy and the UN reform process**

Taking the 2018 P4P report as a starting point, progress on collaborative approaches has been achieved through the socialization of the P4P report, the operationalization of the recommendations of the report via joint mechanisms both at country and headquarters (HQ) levels, and the creation of new facilities to support joint UN-World Bank analysis and efforts. All of this was catalyzed by P4P’s risk-informed framework, but it has transformed over the past year to focus within the Bank on the FCV strategy, and within the UN on the implementation of the secretary-general’s reform initiatives.

It is important to note that emphasis on the UN-Bank partnership on these issues pre-dates P4P. The twin sustaining peace resolutions of 2016 called for closer collaboration with the Bank on efforts to prevent conflict, and the 2016

World Humanitarian Summit resulted in a commitment to a “new way of working,” leading to the joint UN–World Bank Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) initiative: a \$3.6 million joint investment that aimed to facilitate collaboration across the nexus (pilot countries were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen).

### *Steps toward strengthened internal approaches to prevention*

Within both the UN and the World Bank, the P4P report had an important practical institutional effect, providing a platform to argue for more preventive, upstream approaches, a framework for integrating prevention into development work, and the identification of shared prevention objectives in FCV contexts. The internal labor of socializing this framework has been an important starting point for more preventive and joined-up work.

In the World Bank, the P4P report was signed off on by the Bank’s president, and supported the case that the World Bank has a range of relevant tools—including the Risk Mitigation Regime and the Global Crisis Risk Platform.<sup>1</sup> This case influenced International Development Association (IDA) replenishment and the implementation of IDA18, most importantly, for the four Risk Mitigation Regime countries: Niger, Guinea, Tajikistan, and Nepal. These formed a set of countries for which operationalizing P4P, based on Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) and often drawing on the State and Peacebuilding Fund, became a focus of operational and policy units alike. The Bank also diversified by including Tunisia, a middle-income country that is not part of IDA18. Lessons learned from this experience informed decisions around IDA19, in particular the design of the dedicated Prevention and Resilience Allocation (more on this in Box 2).

The most important internal strengthening effort, however, has been the development of the World Bank’s first-ever FCV strategy. The Bank undertook extensive consultations, including with the UN, from April to September 2019, and ultimately launched the strategy in March 2020. The objective is to maximize the institution’s collective resources, expertise, and programs to address development challenges in FCV settings. The strategy provides a plan of action for the medium to long term, including a set of indicators for monitoring the World Bank’s progress on FCV and a new set of funding “envelopes” in IDA19 for FCV countries facing specific risks.

In the UN, P4P has strengthened an already rich stream of work on prevention, linking more closely the logic of preventive diplomatic approaches to development instruments. The UN’s initial P4P socialization efforts at

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<sup>1</sup> The IDA18 Mid-Term Review noted, “A key priority has been the expanded and systematic use of Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) and ensuring these inform Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs), Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs), and in turn to ‘doing things differently’ in operations.” IDA18 Mid-Term Review: Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (World Bank, 2018), p. i.

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The UN has focused on operationalizing a preventive approach through the secretary-general's reforms

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headquarters level were driven by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), often through the lens of sustaining peace, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). With the UN secretary-general's reforms in 2019, the file on UN-Bank partnership in the peace and security pillar has been consolidated in PBSO, providing a single platform for coordination. The reforms also now form the basis for implementing a more preventive approach across the UN.

Within the peace and security pillar, PBSO has strengthened capacity to engage with counterparts within the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO). There are now dedicated staff in PBSO to feed into the regional monthly review (RMR) process on country situations, including by helping to improve risk analysis. PBSO is also doing more to bring the Bank into the RMR analysis. With DPO, there have been discussions on how to generate practical ideas for a more collaborative approach with the Bank during peace operations drawdowns and transitions.

The UN reform process has provided the building blocks for enhanced collaboration between the peace and security and development pillars. This includes a strengthening of the roles of the resident coordinators and peace and development advisors as vectors for prevention at the country level across the system. It also includes the creation of new planning tools, such as the new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and the Common Country Analysis, launched in 2019, which provide more opportunities to employ a risk-sensitive and strategic approach—although this may be realized only with a strong push by resident coordinators. PBSO is also working on program guidance on operationalizing P4P to be rolled out later in 2020.

Taken together, these internal efforts at both the Bank and the UN are key underpinnings to more effective joint action.

### *Operationalizing P4P*

At country level, as mentioned, the Bank selected the four countries of the IDA18 Risk Mitigation Regime (Niger, Guinea, Tajikistan, Nepal) and Tunisia as an initial focus for efforts to apply P4P recommendations. The UN has focused on operationalizing a preventive approach through the secretary-general's reforms, with a focus on partnership efforts in Burkina Faso, Lebanon, Liberia, and Zimbabwe, among others.

A joint UN-World Bank visit to **Zimbabwe** in 2018 convened the UN resident coordinator, the country team, the government and the World Bank country manager with the objective of endorsing joint UN and Bank support for assessing critical reform and requirements to support inclusive economic growth, poverty reduction, and social cohesion (focused on the most vulnerable) in the country. Using the Recovery and Peacebuilding Methodology, the UN and

World Bank collaborated over several months to develop an assessment that was as attentive to prevention as it was to recovery.<sup>2</sup>

Building on this collaboration, a later 2018 joint mission by PBSO, UNDP, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) assessed key risks, such as macroeconomic crisis, crop failure, cholera, and security. The visit brought into dialogue actors from civil society, government, and other partners. It resulted in the creation of a prevention-related project funded by the PBF, and it catalyzed additional funds from the Bank for social protection initiatives following Cyclone Idai, to which the UN would not otherwise have had access. In early 2020, a joint UN-World Bank-IMF visit to Zimbabwe also focused on prevention issues (discussed in the section on the IMF below).

**Figure 1: UN-IFI Cooperation: Key countries, 2018-2020**



Efforts to align UN and World Bank prevention priorities included joint UN-World Bank missions in 2018 to **Niger** and **Tunisia**. In Niger, the joint team had productive discussions with the government on humanitarian-development issues, and it resulted in a Country Note to inform the World Bank Risk Mitigation Regime allocation. Although there was a plan to align funding from the UN and the Bank on a collaboration on early warning, this did not materialize. In Tunisia, the joint visit in 2018 drew lessons about the need for prevention to be rooted in an operational approach driven by needs on the

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<sup>2</sup> Some reflections on lessons on the shift of the RPBA methodology to prevention are available in Corey Patterson, “Pivoting to Prevention: Implications for RPBA.” Available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/pivoting-prevention-implications-rpbas>.

ground (rather than driven by headquarters). This visit was followed by a PBF-funded project developed on P4P models and coordinated with a Bank-funded program from the State and Peacebuilding Fund. Although not a formal joint mission, the UN and the Bank also collaborated in **Lebanon** on dissemination and consultation with their respective country teams.

Bank country directors and resident coordinators from many of these countries met in February 2019 in Dakar, Senegal, for a two-day reflections workshop. The group found agreement on key risks in their respective countries, and also found that there was more to be done to improve alignment of risk mitigation approaches of the two entities. This meeting highlighted the importance of bringing national governments on board for multilateral discussions on prevention. Practical ideas included more joint policy dialogue with governments, the importance of aligning assessments of risk, and setting agendas through a clearer identification of collective objectives.

#### *Joint initiatives*

Joint efforts have also been emphasized during this period, drawing on and strengthening existing tools. In addition to the joint visits to focus countries, for example, the UN has participated in and drawn on the World Bank's risk RRA and UN-World Bank-European Union (EU) recovery and peacebuilding assessments (RPBA). An important development is the Bank's revised RRA methodology: the new, improved RRA is being piloted this year (2020)—based on the P4P approach—and the UN is looking to contribute to all of these (including: **Chad, Mozambique, Madagascar, and the Gambia**).

For the RPBA, the most significant development is the assessment conducted in **Burkina Faso** across 2019 and 2020, which is the first example of tripartite cooperation in a conflict prevention setting. At the request of the Burkinabe government, in June 2019 the UN, World Bank, African Development Bank, and EU cooperated in the conduct of a joint Prevention and Peacebuilding Assessment (PPBA) looking at opportunities and risks in the six regions facing the greatest insecurity and humanitarian need. An initial joint scoping mission took place in July 2019, identifying four thematic areas for intervention (security and rule of law, social services, local governance, and resilience and social cohesion) and created a process for partners to support the identification of short-term, nationally owned priorities in the regions most affected by insecurity.<sup>3</sup> The results of this exercise were presented by the Minister of Economy, Finance, and Development of Burkina Faso to the Peacebuilding Commission in March 2020.

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<sup>3</sup> Christian Lara and Gabriel Delsol. "Sustaining Peace in Burkina Faso: Responding to an Emerging Crisis," International Peace Institute, May 19, 2020. Available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/2020/05/sustaining-peace-in-burkina-faso-responding-to-an-emerging-crisis>.

### **Box 1: What can we learn from the UN-World Bank Partnership Monitoring Report?**

Since 2017, the UN and the World Bank have published a joint monitoring report on their collaboration. The most recent one, *UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations: Partnership Monitoring Report*, was published in November 2019. The report provides a survey of all UN-Bank cooperation, as well as a summary of relevant country situations by five thematic issues, including one entitled “multidimensional risks and prevention of violent conflicts.”

A few observations relevant to the state of the relationship as it relates to peacebuilding and prevention are:

- A significant number of countries and situations defined as “fragile” in 2019 by the World Bank are not included in the report at all (14 are not mentioned), and many of those that are included do not report at all on the part of the thematic framework that is most relevant for peacebuilding, which is the section “multidimensional risks and prevention of conflict.” Examples of countries that are included but that do not have a section on risks and conflict prevention are Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, and Lebanon.
- The strongest focus of cooperation is with humanitarian and development actors. The topmost frequent mentions on UN entities are: UNICEF: 99; World Food Programme: 59; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 58; UNDP: 35.
- This extends to the issue-area focus. The most frequent thematic keywords appearing in the report are: development: 133; health: 86; humanitarian: 51. The words “conflict” and “peace” are in the top twelve, but with less frequency: conflict: 30; peace: 23.
- Overall, the reporting methods and use of terms appear to vary country to country, with differing uses of terms like “HDP” and “collective outcomes.” For example, collaboration on humanitarian programs (such as Ebola response in DRC) may be referred to as related to “HDP,” but the report lacks detail about what makes these programs “HDP” in particular.

At HQ level, there have been specific efforts to deepen collaboration between senior leadership, through the creation of the UN-World Bank Steering Committee for Crisis Situations and a UN–World Bank working group in 2018. The Steering Committee meets twice a year, bringing together UN assistant-secretaries-general (ASG) and World Bank senior directors to agree on strategic direction and policy and to review country support. In April 2019, this group met in Washington, DC, to discuss alignment of priorities for 2019. The ASGs received a briefing on the FCV strategy and discussed how they can align approaches with the Bank. In February 2020, discussions focused on the **DRC**, **Benin**, and **Togo**.

In addition to the Steering Committee, there is regular cooperation between the ASG for Peacebuilding and the head of the Bank’s FCV unit in order to manage the UN-Bank partnership, as well as between UNDP/PBSO and the Bank as part of the high-level advisory group overseeing the RPBA. While not a standing meeting, at an even higher level, the under-secretaries-general for DPPA and DPO, along with the ASG for PBSO, have met in New York with World Bank Board of Directors, briefing them on specific country situations. Also at HQ level, on the UN side, there are interagency joint steering committees to support resident coordinators working across the HDP nexus, of which the Bank is a member.

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In 2019, the UN created a Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership facility

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At the country/implementation level, there have been a variety of joint engagements that provide field-driven, positive models for future collaboration. Perhaps the most notable among these took place in **Lebanon**, where the World Bank and the UN signed a partnership compact in 2018 in order to align their financing instruments to better support political and social stability in the country. It also allows each institution to carry the other's messages to key actors, thus reinforcing a common approach. While there has been much project-level partnership in other countries, such as Tunisia, the partnership compact in **Lebanon** represents a higher level of ambition in terms of a structural, rather than ad hoc (and project-level), collaboration to leverage the comparative advantages of the two entities. Lebanon is the only country, for example, in which there is a joint accountability mechanism. A key element in the successful establishment of the partnership was the likeminded approach of the World Bank country director and the UN resident coordinator.

**Somalia** represents another positive example where comparative advantages have been leveraged and a more structural/institutional approach achieved. In this case, one advantage that the UN brought was its physical presence in a country that it was difficult for Bank staff to reach. The Bank thus funded a secondment to the UN on risk management that then developed into an institutionalized partnership. Multiple innovations continued to emerge, including the seed idea for the Famine Action Mechanism as well as greater Bank engagement on the financial aspects of security sector reform.

In 2019, the UN created a **Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership (HDPP) facility**, managed by PBSO as part of the PBF, in order to provide rapid and flexible funds to support partnerships between the UN and the World Bank in countries with elevated risks for violence. Although the funds can finance a range of strategic and operational activities—like joint assessments and planning, shared data and analysis, and lessons learned on effective partnerships—the focus is on funding the development of joint strategic or sectoral frameworks. So far, three activities have been approved—in **Burkina Faso** and **Cameroon**, as well as for a global project to align UN-Bank risk analysis for rapid COVID-19 response—with the expectation that 8 to 12 projects will be funded by the end of 2020. While it is too soon to discuss results, a main outcome indicator might be how much money gets put behind the frameworks developed through HDPP funding. The HDPP is currently financed at \$5 million over a period of three years.

#### *The UN and the IMF*

While there may be less to report on the evolution of the relationship between the UN and the IMF in conflict settings, there are nonetheless good signals of positive interactions. An important barrier to IMF engagement has been the heightened sensitivities in engaging with political issues and, relatedly, concern



that programs might be perceived as politically influenced. Yet a 2018 internal evaluation by the IMF, *The IMF in Fragile States*, argues that the IMF should redouble its commitment to fragile states, ensuring that they are a top priority and proposing operational refinements that are adapted to the special circumstances of fragile states (where politics can more easily disrupt their programs) and “positioned as part of the international community’s concerted efforts.”<sup>4</sup> The report also discusses a small number of past examples of cooperation with the UN, in particular the IMF’s contributions to technical assistance to the UN mission in **Kosovo** (relating to rebuilding core state functions). Indeed, the report emphasizes that the IMF’s technical assistance is a critical area of its support to FCV contexts.

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A 2018 internal evaluation by the IMF, *The IMF in Fragile States*, argues that the IMF should redouble its commitment to fragile states

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With this in mind, there are several country examples worth highlighting of forward-looking dialogue between the UN and the IMF. In **Somalia**, UN-IMF-Bank dialogue yielded a good understanding of the political effects of the IMF’s Staff Monitored Program that allowed the IMF to take bold decisions in a fragile setting—in this case, recognition that debt relief can be a critical factor in shoring up peace.<sup>5</sup> In **Sudan**, in looking toward the peacekeeping transition, the Special Envoy began to engage the IMF on macroeconomic issues relating both to the peacekeeping and the larger democratic transition that has been unfolding. This included hiring a senior consultant (formerly of the World Bank) who could liaise with both the Bank and the IMF on the ground. In **Zimbabwe**, an informal joint UN-WB-IMF country visit, which stemmed from an RMR discussion at the UN, took place in 2020. The visit served a useful function in strengthening a sense of utility in coordination.

These positive signals aside, the relationship with the IMF lacks the structural and catalytic elements that have been created with the World Bank, especially through the P4P process.

## Key challenges

As the above summary demonstrates, certain aspects of UN-IFI partnership have claimed a lot of ground over the past few years, while others have moved more slowly. Below are some of the key challenges that that have emerged from this review of recent cooperation. There challenges are even more salient in a world in which the first- and second-order consequences of COVID-19 have the potential to destabilize hard-won peace processes (for example, in Afghanistan), to create conditions for social unrest, and to place commodity-dependent,

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<sup>4</sup> IMF Independent Evaluation Office, *The IMF and Fragile States* (Washington, DC, 2018), p. 43. Available at: <https://ieo.imf.org/~media/IEO/Files/evaluations/completed/04-03-2018-the-imf-and-fragile-states/fs-report-web.ashx>.

<sup>5</sup> For more information, see Marc Jacquand, “Opportunities and Challenges for Greater UN-IFI Collaboration across Macroeconomic/FCV Linkages” (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2020). Available at: <https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/opportunities-and-challenges-greater-ifi-un-collaboration-across-macroeconomicfcv>.

fiscally cash-strapped, and deeply indebted governments in an even worse fiscal position right at the moment when people need the state the most.

### ***Finding common ground on risks and resilience***

The international system is in many ways designed to assist states to identify and manage risks in silos. Yet, as COVID-19 has highlighted, states are increasingly mobilizing to address a convergence of threats, from climate change to terrorism. One issue is the different methods the UN and IFIs use to identify countries that are at risk, and how to align those priorities. Relatedly, once country priorities have been identified, another challenge is to rally actors around a common set of risk and resilience factors at country level, which implies joint analysis and coordination, rather than working in silos. The IMF's inputs on macroeconomic risks, as well as the fiscal space to address risk factors such as grievances around social services, for example, are critical in this process. This is particularly so as popular protests are set to resurge in 2020 in the face of the pandemic, posing challenges specifically for conflict-affected countries.

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Complicating the situation is the fact that the institutions work on multiyear planning cycles that, once programmed, offer limited maneuverability. While having longer-term plans is important for achieving progress on development objectives, it can be hard to reorient resources to address short-term risks that may be rapidly changing in the present environment.

### ***Increasing national ownership and adapting to sensitivities around prevention***

There is a need to assess—realistically—the commitment of governments to prevention and the degree of national ownership over prevention strategies. Preventive approaches will stall in countries where there are no credible interlocutors at the right level of seniority to champion prevention within government.

Many countries are concerned about being seen as a place where “conflict prevention” might be needed, even as governments may pragmatically understand and accept the risks and fault lines in their societies. Lessons from the initial phase of P4P implementation indicate that it is not necessary to use an explicit “prevention lens,” in order to spur government preventative action. In such contexts, alternative frameworks like sustaining peace, resilience, social cohesion or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be used to discuss the same politically sensitive issues, yielding more productive results.

### ***Overcoming the “mosquito-bite” approach***

While the UN and the Bank, in particular, have had good success at project level, prevention requires a higher level of ambition. This is precisely where things get

difficult, owing to lack of a common risk and resilience analysis, but also because of differing institutional incentives and mandates.

Direct contact (“face time”) between senior leadership and field leadership can help, for example, in some cases, and missions deploying previous resident coordinators and World Bank country directors may also be of assistance in helping field leadership judge the risks and rewards of strategic support. However, lessons from other areas of UN and Bank collaboration, such as on forced displacement, have also highlighted the importance of IDA in driving corporate action. As such, the Prevention and Resilience Allocation of IDA19 provides a unique opportunity to align efforts. A big challenge here is also connecting the right parts of the UN and the Bank hierarchies. While a Bank country director may not give as much attention to the UN resident coordinator (given the comparatively small footprint of the UN in many countries), they could potentially benefit from and respond to some of the UN’s senior leaders at regional and HQ level.

### *The need for stronger structural relationships*

While much has been done to develop a more structural relationship between the UN and the Bank in particular, including the senior-level steering committee and regular communications between the ASG for peacebuilding and the head of the FCV unit, this has not yet translated into a more consistent engagement on agreed peacebuilding priorities. With respect to the IMF, there is still a gap in relation to a more structured discussion on peacebuilding or FCV contexts.

## **Key opportunities**

In spite of these challenges, this review of collaboration over the past two years also shows significant opportunities. For the UN, these are raised by the UN’s ongoing development system and management reforms; for the World Bank, this revolves around the FCV strategy; and for the IMF this is spurred by the internal interest to better engage in FCV contexts, due partly to the 2018 internal evaluation referenced above.

With the sudden eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is the potential for even more partnership as the world mobilizes its resources to respond. For fragile and conflict-affected countries, implementation of a preventive, joined up approach is needed now more than ever.

### *Leveraging complementary approaches*

- The three entities have many different strengths. One relevant to the UN and the Bank is the much larger level of resources that the Bank can bring to a preventive approach, on the one hand, versus on the other, the UN’s strong field presence (including sub-nationally), rich data sources, logistical capacities, and its normative mandate covering everything from

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The UN and the Bank should cooperate on dialogues to identify national peacebuilding priorities—and unlock FCV funding for them

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development to human rights. The UN can often bring experience in convening national dialogues at a political level, whereas the Bank brings experience on technical issues such dialogues may discuss, such as fiscal policies to address inequality. Another relevant difference is that the Bank has an advantage in mid-range programs focusing on institution building, whereas the UN remains faster and more flexible in most situations to support short-term initiatives. With regard to the IMF, the technical assistance it can offer in strengthening core state functions can be critical in any FCV context. Additionally, the path that the IMF charts to macroeconomic health can help or hinder a broader prevention agenda—for example, in the approach it takes to issues of equity.

- For these complementary approaches to succeed, greater alignment across underlying risk analysis will be required. A good practice here is to ensure that the UN and IFIs have clear entry points in respective planning processes. For example, in Sudan, the World Bank has supplied a dedicated UN focal point to support transition planning. This should be replicated in upcoming processes.

***Agreeing on the most urgent prevention priorities and leveraging the FCV envelope***

- The UN and the Bank, in particular, should cooperate on dialogues to identify national peacebuilding priorities—and unlock FCV funding for them. The UN should work closely with the government to create inclusive and participatory processes to set peacebuilding priorities, which could then provide the framework to unlock the additional funding in the World Bank’s FCV envelopes. This additional funding—on top of IDA19 funding—could substantially finance national peacebuilding goals. The resident coordinator can play an important role in this process, which is less about financing for the UN than it is about reorienting big financing flows to national peacebuilding priorities.
- Another key opportunity centers on identifying countries at risk and in need of a coherent preventive approach that is aligned across government and international institutions. Currently, there is no shared international mechanism either for identifying these countries or for ensuring that they are on the agenda of the UN and the IFIs. It may be too ambitious to develop a shared formula—however, partnership mechanisms between IFIs and UN should be established to maintain information exchange and dialogue where lists of “at risk” countries overlap or align.

### **Box 2: The IDA19 FCV Envelope**

Not only is IDA19 providing more funds than ever before (\$18.7 billion), it has created a more specialized toolkit for FCV settings, which should be a key area for UN engagement at country level. IDA19 has created an envelope specifically for countries facing FCV challenges, which will provide *additional* funds to the IDA19 country allocations. The FCV envelope consists of:

- A **Prevention and Resilience Allocation** for “enhanced support for countries at highest risk of descending into high-intensity conflict or large-scale violence”; countries will receive a 75 percent boost to their allocation, up to a cap of \$700 million, during IDA19
- A **Remaining Engaged during Conflict Allocation** that enables IDA “to maintain a base level of engagement in a small number of countries that experience high-intensity conflict and have extremely limited government capacity”; importantly, this facility will also codify partnership with UN agencies and international NGOs in some circumstances for development initiatives
- A **Turn Around Allocation** that will “support countries emerging from a period of conflict, social/political crisis, or disengagement, where there is a window of opportunity to pursue reforms that can accelerate a transition out of fragility”; countries will receive a 125 percent top-up with a cap of \$1.25 billion during IDA19

In addition to these innovations, IDA19 has also created a **Window for Host Communities and Refugees** (to mitigate the spillover effects of FCV) as well as an IDA **Private Sector Window** (focusing on the poorest and most fragile IDA markets).

### ***Empowering champions for prevention at national and international levels***

- One lesson learned so far is that without national ownership on prevention, forward progress will be difficult. But opportunities exist to increase national ownership of prevention through identifying champions within relevant ministries and doing more advocacy around the general benefits of a preventive approach. The SDGs, including SDG 10 and 16, can also be used to build national ownership on a preventive approach. Advocacy at the international level, particularly with member states at the UN, could help to desensitize countries’ concerns about being viewed as a country “at risk” of conflict. This can be done through highlighting positive national visions for prevention and through taking a universal approach, in which all countries (not just “at risk” ones) highlight their vulnerabilities. At the UN, putting prevention in the context of the agreed sustaining peace framework may assist. Nationally led, successful prevention is sovereignty enhancing.

### ***Creating convening platforms at national level***

- The World Bank, the IMF, and the UN have differing mandates and institutional incentive structures, which may make cooperation on small projects easier than cooperation at a higher level of ambition. One opportunity to raise that level higher is in creating a framework or platform for convening that could serve to guide a more strategic conversation among national government and international actors. Such frameworks have previously been established through, for example, the

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New Deal framework in **Somalia**; however, they have always remained ad hoc. An agreed convening platform would provide an opportunity for key actors to align on agreed priorities, and to bring comparative expertise and political capital to bear on resolving problems.

### *Strengthening structural relationships*

- At country level, the UN-World Bank partnership in **Lebanon** demonstrates the positive value of a more structural relationship in which institutions carry one another's messages, align funding and objectives, and have a mutual accountability structure against an agreed-upon compact. This model should be highlighted for potential adaptation in other countries.
- At HQ level, member states have a role to play in using their board membership at the World Bank and the IMF to signal more systematically the importance of enhanced cooperation with the UN.
- Also, to catalyze a more structural relationship, and following the UN-World Bank P4P model, the three institutions could consider an ambitious joint forward research agenda, one that cuts across disciplinary lines on the diagnosis and treatment of fragility. In the field, there is a demand to unpack what specific types of initiatives—whether in the political, security, or development roles—can be undertaken by governments to give flesh to P4P's finding that one dollar in prevention reaps 16 dollars in benefits: for governments and for those supporting them in the field, there is a desire for more examples and evidence on what types of investment really work.

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The Center on International Cooperation is a non-profit research center housed at New York University. Our vision is to advance effective multilateral action to prevent crises and build peace, justice, and inclusion.

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