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NYU | CENTER ON  
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COOPERATION



## NYU Center on International Cooperation Business Plan

September 2022 –  
August 2024

# CIC Business Plan, September 2022–August 2024

## Table of Contents

<i>Executive Summary</i> .....	<i>i</i>
<i>CIC Business Plan</i> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Vision and Mission</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>2. Thematic programs</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Defending and Promoting Multilateralism program .....	1
Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding.....	3
Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just Inclusive Societies .....	7
<b>3. Country level programs</b> .....	<b>15</b>
Congo Research Group.....	15
Middle East and North Africa.....	17
<b>4. Finance, operations, and communications</b> .....	<b>20</b>
Finance and operations .....	20
Communications.....	21
Risks and risk mitigation.....	23
<b>Annex 1: Progress to date and results 2020-21</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>Thematic programs</b> .....	<b>25</b>
Promoting and Defending Multilateralism Program.....	25
Prevention and Peacebuilding Program .....	26
Humanitarian Crises Program.....	28
Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies .....	29
<b>Regional and country level programs</b> .....	<b>34</b>
Congo Research Group.....	34
Middle East and North Africa.....	35

# Executive Summary

## Vision

The Center on International Cooperation's (CIC's) vision is to advance effective multilateral action to prevent conflicts and crises and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.

## Mission and comparative advantage

Our mission is to strengthen cooperative approaches among national governments, international organizations, and the wider policy community to advance peace, justice, and inclusion. CIC's comparative advantage lies in three areas:

- First, CIC specializes in the links between politics, security, justice, humanitarian responses, and sustainable development. We have staff with expertise in these different areas, and as an institution we forge links between them.
- Second, we focus on analysis and idea generation that is principled, practical, and policy relevant. CIC is ambitious while also being sensitive to evolving political realities and constraints on collective action in response to international problems.
- Third, we have built a strong understanding and relationships of trust with multilateral institutions over two decades. In particular, we have a proven track record of working closely with the member states and organizational leadership of the United Nations (UN) and international financial institutions (IFIs).

## Context

The world continues to face complex and intertwined shocks: 2021-22 saw not only the deepening of the second-generation effects of COVID-19, with a widening disconnect in recovery, but also the multiple global impacts of the invasion of Ukraine. Three elements will characterize the environment for our work in 2022-23:

- *Under-attended trends in conflict risk.* 2021-22 saw a rapid rise in the number of people living under sanctions and unconstitutional government changes, and disconnected from many forms of international support, equivalent to 49 percent of the total population of fragile and conflict-affected states. Traditional international approaches and aid modalities do not work in these environments. The invasion of Ukraine has spurred countervailing forces for unity and disunity between countries, and its political and economic aftershocks create risks of social upheaval and communal conflict in low-, middle- and high-income countries alike. CIC's cross-regional and country work in this context may be more challenging but is doubly important.
- *A narrow member state focus* on the impact of the three crises we have seen in quick succession, compounding each other (pandemic-economic and social tensions-Ukraine invasion). Inward-looking concerns creates a situation where forgotten crises in other regions multiply and cannot attract the international attention needed to help national actors resolve them. Conflict and violence prevention, the sustainable development goals (SDGs), financing for development, and other crucial long-term multilateral initiatives are losing attention at an abstract level. Yet they remain crucial as actual, real-life strategic and operational responses to the current situation. Focusing our work this year on national situations in crisis that need prime international attention (such as people-centered accountability and

recovery, secondary violence impacts, inequality, and food security) is a way to continue and build traction on ideas that we have worked on for much longer periods.

- *New openings for unity despite challenges.* With a divided P5 at the UN Security Council, UN processes are very difficult in many areas. Nonetheless, the UN gained credibility with the role the secretary-general played in mediating the agreement over the release of grain stocks from Ukraine, and small gains have been made in the midst of the tumult, for example, in agreeing on General Assembly processes after the use of the veto at the Security Council. The High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism and the series of upcoming UN summits—Transforming Education Summit, the SDG Summit, and the Summit of the Future—offer, if managed adroitly, a pathway to the transformational change that is required.

In sum, this is a dangerous moment for multilateralism, where skepticism abounds, and forces pull countries and people in different directions. Yet the volatility will also present opportunities for action.

## Objectives and narrative

CIC's objectives over the next two years are to advocate for big ideas, while continuing to showcase small, practical steps that show the value of multilateral action, both in the formal organizations and in more flexible multi-stakeholder groupings. We believe that a new narrative is needed to restore credibility in international actions, and that this must include *listening* to what divides us, *acting* on what unifies us, and focusing on *results that are visible* to people around the world in their daily lives.

## Organizational theory of change

Our organizational theory of change, across all of CIC's work, has the following assumptions:

- National and international efforts support each other—for example, using international platforms to showcase and give momentum to national reforms, and to bring new ideas and to address global issues which no one country can address alone.
- Successful change is generally achieved through a complementary relationship between those in charge of decisions (governmental leadership, private sector, and multilateral decision-makers) and those who can catalyze, advocate, and influence from civil society, academia, and member states.
- Data and evidence are crucial, both in building the case for change and ensuring that the changes we advocate are the right ones, likely to deliver results.

## Key outcomes and outputs supported

- **Thematic areas.** Across CIC, we will focus on achieving the following major outputs and impacts in 2022–2024, which will also be highlighted in our monthly analyses and communications:
  - **Mitigating the secondary effects of the invasion of Ukraine and COVID-19,** to address the divided perceptions and practical spillovers of COVID-19 and the Ukraine conflict. Major outputs will include analysis on the effects of multiple crises (food, energy, debt, climate) on inequality and political stability, work to support political-economic linkages amongst the UN and the IFIs, to support dialogue amongst member states, and the launch of a new Pathfinders multi-stakeholder Action Platform on Inequality and Division.

- **Staying engaged in politically-estranged “forgotten crises” and the localization of assistance.**  
We will publish a major report, jointly with Chatham House, on aid modalities in countries that have gone through unconstitutional changes and sanction. We will follow up on this with work in our humanitarian program on the implications for localization of assistance and in our UN-IFI program on specific politically-estranged country situations.
- **Promoting unifying ideas on peace, justice, and inequality, linked to *Our Common Agenda*** and the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, and to mark the anniversary of the Pathways for Peace report. We will research several aspects of what could be contained in the New Agenda for Peace, including a new Flagship Report on Halving Global Violence, new evidence on nationally-owned, sovereignty supporting prevention strategies, what works in peace-centered access to justice, and ways to build on the potential of the UN’s role in the Ukraine grain deal for broader political and security action that delivers social and economic benefits. This work will also mark the anniversary of the landmark UN-World Bank report on pathways to peace, which highlighted the potential for greater action on prevention, and will include new collaborative work on security-development linkages between the UN and the IFIs, and on a strategic playbook for cooperation.
- **Regional and country level.** CIC will focus on a number of regions and countries that risk being “forgotten crises:” West and Central Africa, Syria and its surrounding region, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste and, to be determined—Haiti, Sudan, and Myanmar. Within Pathfinders, in addition to supporting fragile situations, we will also work with middle- and high-income countries to help exchanges on their challenges along with supporting and showcasing their progress. These countries include several in the Latin American and Caribbean, Indonesia, Canada, Spain, and the Netherlands.

### Key workstreams:

These guide our work across the following organizational units:



A growing number of our programs will involve joint work across CIC (see Box 1).

#### **Box 1: Joint programs across CIC**

CIC, like every organization dealing with international issues, has its own silos. We have consistently worked to encourage more joint work that takes advantage of CIC's expertise in different programs. In 2022-23, this will include programs on:

- **Mitigating the spillover effects of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine** (multilateral, prevention and humanitarian, and Pathfinders' Grand Challenge on Inequality and Exclusion)
- **Aid modalities for staying engaged in forgotten crises** (multilateral, crisis prevention and humanitarian)
- **New Agenda for Peace and other aspects of Our Common Agenda, input to the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism** (Multilateral reform, peacebuilding and prevention, and Pathfinders' Movement to Halve Global Violence)
- **Trialing local interventions for violence prevention** (Congo Research Group and Pathfinders' Movement to Halve Global Violence)
- **Justice for refugees and mental health, and access to mental health and psychosocial support** (Pathfinders' Justice for All program and crisis prevention)

#### **Joint work across Pathfinders**

The Pathfinders' three Grand Challenges lead on national engagement, thereby enabling more substantively/technically specialized staff to be on the frontlines of national delivery. Particular attention is paid nonetheless to working together (across the Grand Challenges), as well as to working with a broad range of partners even when national engagement is led by justice, inequality and exclusion, or violence reduction.

To increase joint work at country level and thematically, Pathfinders will:

- Have grand challenges represent other pillars during in-person country missions and virtual engagements with capitals in Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste (also jointly with prevention and peacebuilding), Colombia (also jointly with prevention and peace-building), Chile, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Ukraine, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Conduct work on the secondary impacts of Ukraine inside Ukraine and in the region, including on people's access to justice, small arms spillovers, and rising inequality and exclusion and its links to food security.
- Start scoping work on climate and SDG16+, with an initial output around the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP).

# CIC Business Plan

September 2022 – August 2023

## 1. Vision and Mission

The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) is a non-profit research center housed at New York University (NYU).<sup>1</sup> CIC's vision is to advance effective multilateral action to prevent crises and to build more peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. Our mission is to strengthen cooperative approaches among national governments, international organizations, and the wider policy community to advance peace, justice, and inclusion around the world.

## 2. Thematic programs

### *Defending and Promoting Multilateralism program*

The objectives of the [\*\*Defending and Promoting Multilateralism\*\*](#) (multilateral reform) program are to defend and promote multilateralism in a period of growing tensions and polarization. The program has three workstreams—the case for action and solutions; UN-IFI cooperation, and UN senior appointments.

Since the beginning of COVID-19, CIC has published a series of [\*\*regular analytical pieces\*\*](#) on **multilateral opportunities** to a direct audience of more than 500 decision-makers in governments, civil society, and the multilateral system. We will continue this over 2022-23, analyzing forward risks and opportunities for multilateralism in line with the commitment of the United Nations to strengthen strategic foresight, and identifying opportunities for action around the upcoming UN Summits and other international events. This work will have a particular focus on mitigating the spillover effects of COVID19 and the invasion of Ukraine in divided perceptions and socio-economic spillovers.

CIC's [\*\*UN-IFI program\*\*](#) seeks to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN and IFIs in addressing the challenges of fragile, conflict, and violence-affected contexts. In 2022-23 we will focus particularly on two main issues: the particular constraints experienced by the multilateral system in staying engaged in politically charged situations such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other countries that have experienced unconstitutional changes in government; and elevating cooperation in prevention and transitional situations to a more strategic level. The latter will look at political economy of the impact of food and energy prices and rising debt on conflict risks and on dialogue. The program will include country and region-specific support, training, and senior field leadership briefings and, over the two-year period, the development of a strategic playbook for multilateral cooperation on conflict and macro-economic linkages.

**Senior appointments at the multilateral institutions** are important to reflect global diversity in experience and ensure highly capable leadership and management. We will continue to monitor this crucial area through the [\*\*UN senior appointments dashboard\*\*](#). Analysis in 2022-23 will look at dimensions of regional representation and professional background as well as continuing to monitor the commitment to gender parity.

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<sup>1</sup> CIC is a research center in the Faculty of Arts and Science (FAS) at NYU. It shares with NYU the status of a tax-exempt 501 (3)(c) nonprofit under the US Internal Revenue Code.

Relevant outcomes	Outputs in year 1 (2022–23)	Outputs in year 2 (2023–24)
<p><b>Outcome 1</b></p> <p>Promoting stronger multilateral approaches to current crises by building the case for action and solutions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least <b>six advance briefings</b> to decision-makers, garnering positive feedback and broader coverage</li> <li>• Incorporation of analysis on current challenges following the Ukraine invasion, such as rising prices and debt, inequality, and social peace at events such as those convened by the High-Level Panel on Multilateral Effectiveness and the launch of Inequality Action Platform, among others.</li> <li>• <b>Staying engaged/politically estranged circumstances:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Consultation with UN Executive Committee/Deputies Committee, top humanitarian donors and European Union.</li> <li>○ Publication of report and work with OECD-DAC on dissemination, follow-up, and application.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Meeting on polarization and collective action at the UN</b>, focused on above issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least <b>six advance briefings</b> to decision-makers, garnering positive feedback and broader coverage</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 2</b></p> <p>Strengthened UN and IFIs approaches to fragility, conflict, and violence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Basic cross-institutional knowledge.</b> At least 2 briefing sessions for senior field leadership of the UN and IFIs</li> <li>• Staying engaged/politically contested circumstances. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Consultations at International Monetary Fund, World Bank,</li> <li>○ Annual meeting launch</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Elevating strategic collaboration</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ At least one regional/country-focused support exercises</li> <li>○ Initial information gathering on lessons learned on UN-IFI collaboration in the field</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Basic cross-institutional knowledge.</b> At least two briefing sessions for senior field leadership of the UN and IFIs</li> <li>• Staying engaged/politically contested circumstances. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ OECD-DAC guidelines</li> <li>○ Updated UN guidance</li> <li>○ Input to update and review of IFI fragility, conflict, and violence strategies</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Elevating strategic collaboration</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ At least two country support exercises</li> <li>○ Phase II: country stock take report</li> <li>○ Strategic playbook</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 3</b></p> <p>Improved diversity and capability in UN senior appointments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Regular updating and usage of the dashboard</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ New analysis on regional progress, professional backgrounds, and gender parity</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Regular updating and usage of the dashboard</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ New analysis, TBD</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

### *Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding*

In 2023, CIC is combining two areas of work that are linked across the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding (HDP) nexus: its work on Prevention and Peacebuilding and on Humanitarian Crises.

The **Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding** program supports efforts to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian response, development support, and peacebuilding (the HDP nexus) in countries grappling with crises and crisis prevention. The objectives of the program are to provide an evidence base for improving responses on the ground and to contribute to policymaking in support of collective action at the global, regional, and national levels.

This joined-up program will build on the achievements of CIC's previous work: namely, its efforts to operationalize the prevention agenda at the UN (including its leading-edge work on nationally-led prevention and on Good Peacebuilding Financing), its support for data-driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding, and its work to strengthen the HDP nexus at country level. As the UN starts to implement *Our Common Agenda*—which highlights the need for a preventive approach, for better financing options, for better foresight capabilities, and the need for integrated HDP work—this combined program will bring a newly integrated angle to global policy discussions and country-level practice.

### *Operationalizing prevention*

CIC's work on [prevention and peacebuilding](#) has focused on two sides of effective peacebuilding: national ownership and acceptance, and good financing practices. In 2022-23 we will build on this work to consider with member states and counterparts within the UN system the value of drawing together lessons into voluntary guidance. This may be complemented by guidance for the UN Peacebuilding Fund on effective prevention and the measurement of peacebuilding results.

Over the next year, our program will draw on two new partnerships. First, in partnership with the NYU's School of Law, we will provide a platform for member states at the UN and in capitals to engage with new research on what makes for successful, nationally-led prevention. Secondly, alongside a group of UN entities and the World Bank, we will draw together existing evidence on development-security links in the context of security sector reform to inform a joint UN-World Bank guidance note. Looking ahead, we will also build on the [Good Peacebuilding Financing](#) and [Data for Peacebuilding and Prevention](#) work by considering the options for an Impact Hub, as part of the New Agenda for Peace.

Our work on the New Agenda for Peace will draw on this research and will also bring together inputs from across CIC, including the value of multistakeholder partnerships (Pathfinders), and exploring the possibility of more UN mediation to deliver economic and social results, building on the Ukraine grain deal.

### *Humanitarian crises*

The work of the humanitarian crises program is guided by the conclusions of our major, multi-year [review](#) of efforts by the UN and its partners to operationalize the triple nexus, and in particular to collectively address the risks and inequities that lock people into crisis, often for generations on end. The pandemic, and more recently

the war in Ukraine, have only reinforced the necessity (and difficulty) of such collaborative action to resolve protracted crises, given their interlocking health, humanitarian, economic, and political repercussions.

In the next year, the program will focus on

- *Government and localization*: with a focus on the Middle East which is deeply impacted by the socio-economic effects of COVID19 and the Ukraine war, the program will work with the UN to strengthen its support to public institutions to take more ownership/leadership on the nexus in contexts of humanitarian crisis, wherever this can be done while respecting humanitarian principles.
- *Politically-contested circumstances*: in contexts where there is a major disconnect between the international community and national government, the program will support the humanitarian system to work more closely with development/peacebuilding actors to identify options to empower local (municipal/civil society/community) actors and institutions over time.
- *UN reform and capacity on the nexus*: the program will convene an informal, senior-level advisory group to unpack ways of strengthening UN capacity to accelerate progress on the nexus.

#### ***Data-driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding***

In 2022, we completed Phase 1 of our efforts to strengthen the ecosystem of actors and start to build capacity of local actors to use data-driven technologies in their peacebuilding work. We undertook our [third international workshop](#), which focused on lessons learned from the humanitarian field about data-driven approaches in fragile- and conflict-affected contexts, partnering with UN OCHA's Centre for Humanitarian Data. We worked with the UN Department of Peace Operations on monitoring of the Action for Peacekeeping+ (A4P+) framework. We published and convened meetings on cutting-edge issues relating to early warning/early action, smart cities, cybersecurity, and others. In the next year, alongside the development of the Complex Risk Analytics Fund (CRAF'd) facility, we will aim to hold a fourth meeting on data for peace based on country-level analysis of social media. We will also scope out the possibility of a more consolidated capacity for holding data related to the HDP nexus, which is now spread around the UN system.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 1: 2022-2023	Outputs Year 2: 2023-2024
<b>Outcome 1</b>  Strengthened operationalization of the UN prevention agenda to support national prevention efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>National prevention and evidence-based action.</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ At least two country level cases completed</li><li>○ At least two workshops held with member states and the UN system</li><li>○ Three to four evidence-based policy documents that will feed into political dialogues and/or other media such as podcasts and videos.</li><li>○ Updated UN guidance</li><li>○ Draft guidelines completed</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Development-security/security sector reform (SSR) guidance</b></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>National prevention and evidence-based action.</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ At least two country level cases completed</li><li>○ Three to four evidence-based policy documents</li><li>○ Voluntary guidelines adopted by UN system and supported by member states</li></ul></li><li>• Support given to at least two countries developing national prevention strategies or incorporating prevention as a goal of national development plans</li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Draft guidance note produced and adopted by UN and WB</li> <li>○ Dissemination within UN and WB</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcome 2</b>  Strengthen localization of humanitarian assistance and links to peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Government-led localization</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ One to two trainings/briefings with ESCWA for public sector institutions in MENA on public sector roles within the nexus; track progress with baseline study</li> </ul> </li> <li>● <b>Localization in politically contested contexts</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Document policy and practical options for humanitarian engagement with local institutions/architecture (such as community development corporations [CDCs]) in politically contested contexts</li> <li>○ Case studies on Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen, linking humanitarian perspectives to issues such as localization and the HDP nexus."</li> <li>○ Convene donors (one to two meetings, co-hosted with sponsoring member states) and humanitarians (including at least one meeting of resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators) to discuss lessons learned around Yemen, Syria, and wider cases.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● <b>UN humanitarian reform</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Undertake consultations across the UN, and convene one to two meetings of HDP policymakers and experts to identify concrete opportunities for increasing UN capacity to deliver on the nexus</li> <li>● Based on these discussions, develop, and socialize an updated list of recommendations, with a focus on (1) either a standby nexus capacity; (2) or a similar practical initiative</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Government-led localization.</b> Track results in countries in ESCWA pilot</li> <li>● Develop lessons learned for (i) other Arab countries; (ii) other regions</li> <li>● Co-convene 1-2 regional, multistakeholder meetings</li> <li>● <b>Localization in politically contested contexts.</b> In depth study on humanitarian approaches to coup and sanction countries</li> <li>● Guidance/training for humanitarian donors and practitioners on localization</li> <li>● <b>UN reform and capacity on the nexus</b> Produce a report on progress building on prior year's consultations, progress, gaps, and new recommendations</li> <li>● Hold expert level retreat on UN reforms and support institutional discussion</li> </ul>

<p><b>Outcome 2</b></p> <p>Strengthening the global ecosystem for innovative, data-driven approaches to prevention and peacebuilding</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Stock take</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ A stocktake leading to a “Phase 2” development of the Data for Peacebuilding workstream, convening: one international conference, possibly on new trends in the Early Warning/Early Action space; along with ongoing virtual convenings to extend the Data for Peace Dialogues initiative</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Strategic engagement</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Ongoing policy advice to the UN, and governments on options to creating hubs for data and innovation in the prevention and peacebuilding field</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TBD based on Phase 2 plan and evolution of the CRAF'd facility.</li> </ul>
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### *Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just Inclusive Societies*

The peace, justice, and inclusion targets in the Sustainable Development Goals were new when agreed to in 2015: they remain an area which needs accelerated action to palpably improve people's everyday lives and help address our greatest global challenges. Against a backdrop of bleak news cycles and seemingly never-ending challenges to peace and development, the CIC's [\*\*Pathfinders\*\*](#) program, in partnership with member states, civil society actors, and the multilateral system, aims to show SDG16+ for what it is: a credible, accessible, universal, and necessary set of tools to begin to get our world back on track. By amplifying how and why it works, this program will energize champions and convince skeptics alike of the critical importance of the SDG16+ agenda.

2023 marks the halfway point of the 2030 Agenda and the second SDGs Summit. As we approach this milestone and the Summit of the Future, this program will focus on supporting the work of the Pathfinders' Grand Challenges on Halving Global Violence, Inequality and Exclusion and Justice for All, highlighting their cross-cutting nature and collective force in realizing the larger 2030 Agenda, while providing a space for partnership and action.

#### **Joint work across Pathfinders**

The Pathfinders' three Grand Challenges lead on national engagement, thereby enabling more substantively/technically specialized staff to be on the frontlines of national delivery. Particular attention is paid nonetheless to working together (across the Grand Challenges), as well as to working with a broad range of partners even when national engagement is led by justice, inequality and exclusion, or violence reduction. To increase joint work at country level and thematically, Pathfinders will:

- Have grand challenges represent other pillars during in-person country missions and virtual engagements with capitals in Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste (also jointly with prevention and peace-building), Colombia (also jointly with prevention and peace-building), Chile, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Ukraine, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- Conduct work on the secondary impacts of Ukraine inside Ukraine and in the region, including on people's access to justice, small arms spillovers, and rising inequality and exclusion and its links to food security.
- Start scoping work on climate and SDG16+, with an initial blog around the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP).

As an international thought-leader on SDG16+, the Pathfinders will continue to "occupy this space," expanding understanding of SDG16+ targets on peace, justice, and inclusion, supporting partners and the global movement for action, and delivering on its role in international debates and dialogues. This will require developing three interlinked narratives as related to: the coherence and complimentary amongst the three Pathfinders Grand Challenges, the cross-cutting nature of SDG16 and the 2030 Agenda (SDG16+), and the practical relevance of SDG16+ for solutions to global crises. To this end, increased attention will be paid to supporting and promoting substantive collaboration across the Grand Challenges as well as strengthening Pathfinders internal management information systems.

In the near-term, and as we approach the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, we will **develop a strategy for the SDGs Summit and the Summit of the Future**—focused on galvanizing new action on peace, justice, and inclusion—and consolidating gains made amidst global setbacks. As we did in 2021, we will be contributing to polling on

issues of how people see peace, justice, and inclusion today. Together with the SDG16+ coalition, we will aim to develop a calendar of events that build on each other and enhance strategic impact.

At the same time, we will intensify efforts to support country-level results. Through the grand challenges, we will engage in field visits to elicit the positive policies that are already being followed and the challenges on which countries wish to exchange, in an equal partnership between high-, middle-, and low-income countries.

A third main domain of effort will be geared towards mainstreaming evidence and action on SDG16+ into large, and primarily operational, multilateral organizations and bilateral development agencies. Over 2022-24, the Pathfinders will closely engage with a set of development agencies, including the UN, WB, and IMF as well as the OECD and bilateral agencies, to increase the mainstreaming of SDG16+. We will ask our closest donor partners to also make closer contacts in country through their embassies and aid agencies to support results. The potential for impact of this stream of work is significant but will take time to manifest.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 1: 2022-2023	Outputs Year 2: 2023-2024
<p><b>Outcome 1</b>            "Occupying the space," deepening the SDG16+ narratives, and advancing SDG16+ as a tool to address salient global challenges and opportunities, including the secondary impacts of the Ukraine War, climate change, gender, youth, and COVID-19 as related to global financing.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Membership and voice</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Four new members; active cross-regional and civil society participation, one to two joint statements, and one report (e.g., 2023 SDG16+ Report)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Grand Challenges Support and Engagement</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Specifically linking to framing and communications around the Justice Action Coalition, the Inequality and Exclusion Action Platform, and the Halving Global Violence Task Force.</li> <li>○ Supporting joint work on the secondary impacts of Ukraine in Ukraine and in the region</li> <li>○ Two to three joint blog posts or other publications with the Grand Challenges</li> <li>○ Two to three joint events with the Grand Challenges</li> <li>○ Four to five missions or virtual engagements with capitals where one grand challenge and central group represent others or join forces</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>SDG16+ engagement and events</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Strategy to build on different events between Pathfinders streams and the SDG16+ coalition (e.g., shared calendar supporting vision)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Membership and voice:</b> four new members; active cross-regional and civil society participation; one to two joint statements, and one report</li> <li>• <b>Grand Challenges support</b> the link between the SDGs Summit and the Summit of the Future</li> <li>• <b>SDG16+ engagement and events</b> at the SDGs Summit and Summit of the Future</li> <li>• <b>SDG16+ community</b> achieves greater strategic</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Incubate SDG16; Youth, Peace and Security; Women, Peace and Security; and climate initiatives, with two to three events or analytical notes, including to be published around the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28).</li> <li>● <b>New website</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ This includes a new online repository of policies that work to address inequality, exclusion, and division, people-centered justice for all, and halving global violence.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>sequencing of effort to achieve impact</li> <li>● <b>Consider establishment of new cross-cutting work on climate and SDG16+, and youth and SDG16+</b></li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b>  Mainstreaming SDG16+ in large, operational multilateral and governmental agencies, as well as in large INGOs and CSOs (with grand challenges)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Outreach and engagement, international and national</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Five to six initial engagements resulting in at least one successful mainstreaming in global or regional strategy and one joint workplan or advocacy campaign</li> </ul> </li> <li>● <b>Strategic follow-up and events</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ For example, at least one event supporting mainstreaming in one of the larger operational agencies (building momentum to do two-three events in the follow years)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Work to track implementation in agencies who have adopted SDG16+ in strategies and policies</li> <li>● At least two additional mainstreaming exercises of SDG16 in their strategy documents, leading to operational programming</li> <li>● Continued bilateral engagement and convenings with those who have not yet adopted SG16+ at an operational level.</li> </ul>

### ***Pathfinders: Justice for All***

Following the publication of the [Justice for All](#) report in 2019, the Justice for All program is implementing the action agenda set forth in the report. Through building collaborative partnerships and convening key stakeholders, the program has been very successful in shaping and strengthening the global and regional movement and alliances on people-centered justice.

As the secretariat to the newly launched [Justice Action Coalition \(JAC\)](#)—a multi-stakeholder, high-ambition coalition of countries and organizations to close the justice gap—the program has facilitated strategic discussions and exchanges including two Ministerial meetings and three senior-level meetings since April 2021. The second Ministerial meeting in May 2022 launched the [Justice Appeal 2023](#) urging countries and calling upon other key justice actors to close the justice gap by, among other things including investing in data and evidence for people-centered justice policies and systems.

The pandemic and the response to it limited people's access to courts, public services, and legal aid as well as community-based justice and support systems. The program will work closely with the Justice Action Coalition, and governments and partners in 2022-23 to restore the national momentum on people-centered justice, which

was disrupted because of the exogenous shocks in the past couple of years. With these collaborations and partnerships, the program hopes to promote and catalyze accelerated action on SDG16.3 at the international and national levels.

In 2022-23, multi-stakeholder platforms like the Justice Action Coalition, the [Justice Alliance](#), and the [Ibero-American Justice Alliance](#) bring much needed hope for progress on the SDGs. Building on our strong relations with member states and multilateral institutions as well as civil society partner organizations, Pathfinders will continue to support the Justice Action Coalition and convene partner organizations to produce data and evidence to support people-centered justice in the run up to the second SDG Summit in 2023. The program will also continue to support donor dialogues on people-centered, bringing together bilateral donors interested in supporting rule of law and justice to encourage coherence and collaboration on aid in the sector. This will be supplemented with targeted support—and where feasible, joint support in partnership with other Pathfinders Grand Challenges—to interested countries in accelerating nation action on SDG 16.3 and the broader SDG 16 agenda.

Evidence-to-action remains crucial for ensuring equal access to justice for all. Building on the *Justice for All* report, in 2022-23 we will start to focus on the learnings from implementation of Goal 16.3. In particular, we will work towards a shared vision and approach to people-centered justice—examining what it looks like in practice and how can it be measured—while also exploring effective pathways to more people-centered and responsive justice systems.

Relevant Outcome	Outputs in year 1 (2022-23)	Outputs in Year 2 (2023-24)
<b>Outcome 1</b>  Increased national action on people-centered justice to accelerate implementation of <a href="#">SDG16.3</a> (to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As the secretariat to the Justice Action Coalition, organize a Ministerial and a senior-level meeting to promote people-centered justice.</li> <li>Work with two to four interested countries like Colombia, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and Zambia to strategize on and/or implement people-centered justice approaches in their work.</li> <li>Continue to support and partner with the g7+ to promote people-centered justice in fragile and conflict affected contexts, and with Open Government Partnership (OGP) to register new commitments on justice and reporting on existing commitments under the national action plans.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continued strong role in exchange of experience, analysis, and targeted assistance through partnerships at country level, complementing other partners</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b>  Develop more cohesive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Achievement of the deliverables of the Justice Action Coalition before the SDG Summit 2023.</li> <li>Increased impact and scale of financing people-centered justice championed through targeted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Justice Action Coalition joint statement on people-centered justice before the UNGA 2024.</li> </ul>

international support on data, evidence, innovation and financing, and an empowered movement for justice for all	<p>support to the Legal Empowerment Fund supporting civil society and three roundtables with bilateral donors to discuss evidence-based, scalable interventions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10-15 reports and publications on people-centered justice including joint blogs with other Pathfinders Grand Challenges.</li> <li>• 8-10 meetings of the Justice Action Coalition, Justice Alliance partners, justice for women, and the Ibero-American Justice Alliance; organization and/or participation in another ten events including 1-2 joint events in partnership with other Grand Challenges.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued strategic and high impact work on evidence-to-action</li> </ul>
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### ***Pathfinders: Inequality & Exclusion***

In September 2021, the Grand Challenge on Inequality & Exclusion launched its flagship report, [From Rhetoric to Action: Delivering Equality and Inclusion](#). The report brought together the findings and recommendations of more than 30 policy briefs from experts who partnered with the Grand Challenge to develop an understanding of the evidence on policy solutions in the [policy priorities](#) to tackle inequality and exclusion, identified by the members of the Grand Challenge throughout 2020-21. The issues included building solidarity through post-conflict mechanisms, enhancing visible material change through reforming housing and land governance, bridging the digital divide, and supporting the care economy, as well as securing credibility in government with action on trust and accountability, as well as financing for development.

The launch of the flagship report, "[Delivering the UN Common Agenda: Action to Achieve Equality and Inclusion](#)," was co-sponsored by the Leaders Network Reinforcing Multilateralism Together, and featured the participation of the heads of state and governments of Sweden, Spain, Sierra Leone, Costa Rica, Ireland, New Zealand, and Bangladesh, as well as leaders of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA), United Nations Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UN AIDS), Open Society Foundations, the UN Global Compact, and CIVICUS among others, Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, and champions like Forest Whitaker and José Andrés. The event marked the successful completion of the first phase of the Grand Challenge, and we have since moved into the second phase which has required deepening our relationships within countries, as well as building a more permanent global structure for multistakeholder collaboration on how to address inequality and exclusion.

As new drivers of inequality and exclusion emerge in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, the work with partner countries and organizations has intensified in 2022. We are working with partners to implement and learn from the policies detailed in the flagship report and convening actors globally to share best practice and address the global blockages to progress, most notably on financing and food insecurity. We will be advocating at the 2022-23 IFI Annual Meetings and other relevant forums for action to combat these challenges.

Our country engagement has highlighted the importance of divisive narratives as a block to progress on inequality and exclusion. Demand from our partners is driving research and workshops on this topic, including new message testing, over the next 18 months. This will strengthen our work on political strategies that will lead to lower levels of inequality, division, and exclusion.

As inequality and exclusion continue to be both drivers and outcomes of multiple crises, we will be reacting to world events as we endeavor to build on our solutions-focused approach.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2023	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2024
<b>Outcome 1</b> Participating actors pursue an agreed-upon set of policies and issues that require international collective action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Launch of the first Action Platform on Inequality and Division, with high attendance and visible media attention and subsequently at least one joint statement or op-ed from members</li> <li>At least five key events (UNGA, IFI Annual and Spring meetings, Commission on the Status of Women, the High-level political forum, and civil society, and bilateral events)</li> <li>At least four policy solutions papers to draw out policy areas from the Inequality &amp; Exclusion Flagship Report and the secondary effects of the Ukraine invasion, including prices and social peace, debt and fiscal policy, and access to housing</li> <li>Mapping of climate change, inequality, and inclusion issues</li> <li>Regular briefs on blogs on inequality and exclusion trends, in particular around food insecurity, and the wider cost of living crisis.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Second meeting of the Action Platform with related media output</li> <li>Heads of state and government event at the Summit for the Future (prepared or completed, depending on Summit timing)</li> <li>Second Arab Equality Forum in collaboration with UN ESCWA</li> <li>Presence at COP meetings</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b> Participating national actors pursue some of the “comprehensive menu of policy options” to promote and link economic inequality and inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Madrid workshop on messaging and narratives</li> <li>Three to four country visits and/or work with local partnerships to embed policy framework and ideas in partner countries</li> <li>Collaboration with civil society and national governments to tracking commitment related to inequality and inclusion</li> <li>Launch of new online repository of policies that work to address inequality, exclusion, and division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Four to six research outputs on what is working in countries and policy lessons from the cost-of-living crisis</li> <li>New research on what works to combat divisive narratives and how to build unity between groups</li> <li>Launch of new “Policy Makers Conference” co-partners with the</li> </ul>

		<p>London School of Economics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uptick in the number if countries using policy framework and policy ideas detailed in Flagship report</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 3</b></p> <p>Lessons from Pathfinders inspire others to act</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least two new national and two new multilateral or civil society members in Action platform</li> <li>• Clear and growing media presence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further countries and other multilateral or civil society actors join the Action Platform</li> <li>• Increasingly seen as 'go to' on policy ideas, measured by increase in engagement from policy makers and media outlets</li> </ul>

#### ***Pathfinders: Halving Global Violence***

Despite pandemic trials and tribulations, in 2021-22, the Halving Global Violence (HGV) [Task Force](#) was created, [convened](#) for the first time, was publicly [launched](#), issued a [statement](#) highlighting the primacy of violence reduction in the still elusive 'post-pandemic' period, was spotlighted in the UN secretary-general's [Our Common Agenda](#), and added a fifth [Co-Chair](#). Based on the lessons of the recent period, HGV will strive to continue to consolidate the initiatives it helps lead in the areas of urban violence reduction ([Peace in Our Cities](#)) and gender-responsive small arms control ([GENSAC](#)) as closely linked to the work of the Task Force.

Building on these cornerstones, in 2022 and 2023, the Halving Global Violence program will graduate from its "start-up" phase and turn to designing and implementing a concrete set of violence reduction solutions and action-oriented research. HGV will strategically hone into areas that account for both underwhelming international attention and overwhelming prevalence and impact—such as urban violence and interpersonal violence including gender-based violence—while maintaining a medium-term focus on all forms of violence and conflict. The coming 12-18 months will see the publication of a flagship report presenting new research and evidence-based solutions.

HGV also intends to influence discussions around the SDG Summit and the Summit of the Future in 2023, building on the support from multiple governments during deliberations around *Our Common Agenda* for HGV as a prime example of an innovative '[multi-stakeholder effort to reduce all forms of violence](#)', and a crucial part of the [New Agenda for Peace](#).

HGV, in partnership with other workstreams in Pathfinders and CIC, will also remain attuned to national and regional developments that could have important repercussions on levels of violence worldwide. For example, in addition to the direct momentous loss of life and destruction caused by the war in Ukraine, its aftershocks—in

terms of food insecurity and resulting social unrest—could be felt quite far from the “epicenter.” Potential regional proliferation of the massive incoming flow of small arms and ammunition, considering weapons commonly circulate for decades after a conflict ends, could become particularly worrisome and will need to be addressed.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2023	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2024
<b>Outcome 1</b> Halving Global Violence Task Force consolidated as international reference in violence reduction policy discussions and research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>September 2022 HGV Task Force meeting in Geneva</li> <li>Publication plan and process for flagship report concluded</li> <li>Research for HGV Flagship report conducted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One further convenings of the HGV Task Force (2023 and 2024)</li> <li>Publication of HGV Flagship Report (by end of 2023)</li> <li>Dissemination of policy recommendations in flagship report</li> <li>Transition to ‘action’/advocacy platform</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b> Pilot engagements on solutions completed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Korean International cooperation Agency (KOICA) preparatory research in Timor Leste completed</li> <li>Initiation of larger trialing programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo and second location</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successful conclusion of first pilot surveys and interim findings</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b> GENSAC consolidated as premier international reference on gender-responsive small arms, with established secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results highlighted in four to five countries over two regions, and documented in short note</li> <li>Annual GENSAC meeting successfully implemented (early 2023)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results highlighted in four to five countries over two regions, and documented in short note</li> <li>Annual GENSAC meeting (early 2024)</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 3</b> A robust and consolidated Peace in Our Cities (PiOC) network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Annual membership meeting (early 2023)</li> <li>Research agenda designed and implemented</li> <li>30 city members</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Annual membership meeting (2024)</li> <li>35 city members</li> </ul>

### 3. Country level programs

#### *Congo Research Group*

The [Congo Research Group](#) (CRG) was founded in 2015 to promote rigorous, independent research into the violence that affects millions of Congolese. Today, our research aims to explain the complex interplay among violence, politics, and political economy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to a wide audience, to promote debate around policy solutions, and to empower Congolese voices. Since February 2022, CRG has partnered with a new Congolese non-profit organization, [Ebuteli](#). This Congolese research institute focuses on politics, violence, and governance, conducting research and publishing reports and other media in collaboration with CRG.

Over the past two years, CRG—more recently in conjunction with Ebuteli—has pursued three streams of work:

- Political accountability, governance, and the state in DRC
- Security in the East of DRC
- Political economy and economic governance

Over 2022-24, we will build on these streams of work, will complete a discrete large study on the political economy of the Ebola epidemic in the DRC, and will follow discussions on trialing jointly with MHGV and the World Bank local interventions in three sites in the DRC.

Our project on political accountability, governance and the state—“Mukalenga wa Bantu”—will publish multiple reports on accountability within key institutions (political parties, civil society organizations, and citizen movements), while continuing to produce regular [blog posts](#), its [podcast](#) “Masolo Ya Kati” (intimate conversations), and its popular weekly audio [analysis](#) of DRC current events, “Po Na GEC,” all of which are designed to stimulate public debate within the DRC. As part of this project, we also organized debates on political accountability in Kinshasa, Kananga, Lubumbashi, and Kananga.

Its online parliamentary and government tracker, “[Talatala](#),” (mirror, in Lingala), which launched in March 2021, has grown its following, including on [social media](#), as it becomes an increasingly indispensable tool for cataloguing and analyzing the work of the DRC National Assembly. Talatala’s [government tracking component](#), launched in November 2021, is documenting and evaluating commitments made by the executive (68 at the time of publication) in four key sectors: the security system, electoral governance, judicial reform, and anti-corruption efforts. In addition, CRG and Ebuteli have published three public opinion polls on these same issues in 2021 and 2022: one in [July 2021](#), one in [October 2021](#), and one in [March 2022](#), with a forthcoming one in August 2022.

CRG and Ebuteli’s research and analysis on violence in the DRC is organized under the “Miwani Ya Kivu” (Lens on the Kivus) project. In June 2022, we published the first of eight thematic reports on conflict dynamics in the eastern Congo, on the [economic dimensions of Uganda’s military intervention in DRC](#). These reports will be published between now and 2024. Our [Kivu Security Tracker](#) (KST)—which we manage together with Human Rights Watch and the Bridgeway Foundation—has provided, since 2017, a web-based, regularly updated mapping of armed groups and violent incidents in Ituri, and the North and South Kivu provinces through a network of dedicated focal points. This is supplemented with regular [blogs](#), investigative reports, and profiles of armed groups in [Ituri](#) and the [Kivu provinces](#).

The Congolese economy is extremely important to every aspect of the country's political system, and CRG and Ebuteli are also invested in research into economic governance. In January 2021, CRG published a report on the [customs exemptions](#) in DRC, demonstrating how the country loses approximately USD 630 million in revenues annually to exemptions granted without transparency or oversight. In December 2021, as part of the "[Congo Hold-up](#)" investigation, CRG published a [report](#) on how family members of former President Kabila benefited from a money laundering and embezzlement scheme via the DRC affiliate of BGFI Bank. In the next two years, CRG and Ebuteli will publish two reports: one on the use of climate funds domestically in DRC, and a second on the political economy of global climate funding and the DRC's place within it.

Relevant outcome	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2023	Outputs Year 2: 2022-2024
<b>Outcome 1</b> More detailed understanding of the dynamics of armed violence in the Uele, Ituri, and Kivu regions throughout innovative ways to monitor and analyze violence	<b>Kivu Security Tracker</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain and redesign KST website</li> <li>Publish monthly reports, blog posts, and maps</li> <li>Publish map of armed groups</li> </ul> <b>Utafiti ya Amani</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publish eight blog posts on political and security dynamics in the Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele provinces</li> <li>Publish one thematic report on political and security dynamics in the Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele provinces</li> <li>Publish one thematic report on conflict dynamics in eastern Congo</li> <li>Publish 12 radio shows</li> </ul>	<b>Kivu Security Tracker</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain KST website</li> <li>Publish monthly reports, blog posts, and maps</li> <li>Publish map of armed groups</li> </ul> <b>Utafiti ya Amani</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publish four blog posts on political and security dynamics in the Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele provinces</li> <li>Publish one thematic report on political and security dynamics in the Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele provinces</li> <li>Publish three thematic reports on conflict dynamics in eastern Congo</li> <li>Publish 12 radio shows</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 2</b> Promoting the reform and accountability of Congolese institutions	<b>Mukalenga wa Bantu</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain and update "<a href="#">Talatala</a>" tracker</li> <li>Hold one townhall on governance in the DRC</li> <li>Publish six thematic reports on spaces of civic mobilization in the DRC (political parties and civil society)</li> <li>Publish regular blog posts and weekly audio clips on Congolese politics and current events</li> </ul>	<b>Mukalenga wa Bantu</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain and update "<a href="#">Talatala</a>" tracker</li> <li>Publish regular blog posts ("Ebuteli") on Congolese politics</li> <li>Publish weekly audio clips analyzing Congolese current events ("Po Na GEC")</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome 3</b>	<b>Mwangaza V</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Report on the international political economy of climate</li> </ul>	<b>Mwangaza VI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TBD</li> </ul>

<p>Political economy and peacebuilding</p> <p><b>CNPAV</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>change funding and DRC climate funds in particular</li> <li>• Report on the political economy and use of climate funds in DRC, focusing on Le Fonds National REDD+ (FONAREDD)</li> <li>• Publish blog series, "Congo Nouveau"</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Outcome 4</b></p> <p>A better understanding of the Ebola response's impact on conflict dynamics, local economies, and health infrastructure in North Kivu</p>	<p><b>Nani Mponyaji</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publish one report on the political economy of the Ebola response</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Outcome 5</b></p> <p>Understanding the dynamics and drivers of urban and gender-based violence in Goma, Kananga, and Kinshasa</p>	<p><b>New frontiers in preventing GBV and interpersonal violence in conflict-affected settings in the DRC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct baseline data collection</li> <li>• Supervise provision of technical assistance for interventions in each of the three sites</li> </ul>	<p><b>New frontiers in preventing GBV and interpersonal violence in conflict-affected settings in the DRC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publish three reports on violence in each of the three urban areas</li> <li>• Publish policy note summarizing lessons learned</li> </ul>

### Middle East and North Africa

The aims of our work in the MENA region are to contribute, through expert advice and selected country engagements, to CIC's overall goals of preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion. [The appointment](#) in 2017 of CIC's lead in the MENA program to the UN Syria Commission of Inquiry (CoI) has led our MENA program to focus on [Syria](#), by providing supportive analysis on how to improve justice outcomes for victims and survivors. This work has included an ongoing partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and a joint report on [detentions in Syria](#). Follow-up reporting and advocacy by CIC, ICTJ and the Commission of Inquiry have focused on several issues—the impact of the pandemic; the humanitarian situation and aid modalities; the challenges of obtaining or renewing civil documentation; internment and repatriation of families of suspected ISIL fighters—and in particular, the issue of the missing/disappeared in Syria.

During 2021-22 CIC has focused on building public support for establishing an entity with an international mandate to coordinate efforts on the missing/disappeared in Syria. Together with the Syrian Families Associations, we were instrumental in the passage of an [UNGA resolution](#) in December 2021 requesting the secretary-general to study the issue of the missing/disappeared in Syria with the aim of establishing an international coordinating mechanism. Momentum has grown with positive statements and resolutions coming from [Secretary-General Anthony Guterres](#), [High Commissioner Bachelet](#), the [European Parliament](#), the Brussels V Conference [Co-Chairs](#) and individual UN member states.

Key activities on Syria in 2022-24 will include focusing on the recommendations from the secretary-general's study regarding the establishment of an international entity/mechanism; increasing our focus on the humanitarian situation in Syria—impact of Ukraine, unilateral sanctions, cross border restrictions—and the challenges relating to the provision of international assistance particularly in areas beyond government control; lessons from the response to the Ukraine crisis and vice versa; the challenges facing internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Syria who lack civil documents and outlining policy recommendations; and identifying just outcomes for the children and families of suspected members of ISIL who remain held in camps in Northeast Syria. More broadly, the MENA program will continue to seek to expand its collaboration with CIC's programs aimed at preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion by assisting in developing select country programs, identifying effective local partners, and in bringing experts from the region to in-person or virtual international forums.

Relevant outcome	Outputs in year 1 (2022–23)	Outputs in year 2 (2023–24)
<b>Outcome 1</b> Improved justice outcomes for victims and survivors in Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Prepare at least two policy briefs and two blogs on justice-related issues (likely the missing/disappeared; impacts of and lessons from/for Ukraine, sanctions, remittances on the humanitarian crisis, IDPs and civil documents, and children of suspected ISIL affiliates)</li> <li>● Consult and hold meetings/webinars (at least two) with experts in preparation for the policy briefs.</li> <li>● Organize advocacy events, op-eds, social media, etc related to the above issues (at least two).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Prepare two policy briefs and two blogs on justice-related issues</li> <li>● Hold consultations; meetings and webinars (at least two)</li> <li>● Publish Op Eds, organize events, speak at forums, utilize social media as advocacy to support the issues identified through the policy briefs</li> </ul>

<p><b>Outcome 2</b></p> <p>Increased involvement of CIC programs in the MENA region, aimed at preventing new crises and promoting peace, justice, equality, and inclusion.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Assist in identifying           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ MENA countries for national programs (at least two)</li> <li>○ National/local partners or collaborators (at least three per country)</li> <li>○ Experts from the region participate in regional or international forums.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Assist CIC programs to deepen their programs in selected MENA countries through joint programming (two)</li> <li>● Increase the number of national partners or collaborators (50 percent)</li> <li>● Share experiences within MENA countries on a specific area/theme (likely on humanitarian delivery; transitional justice approaches during and after conflicts)</li> </ul>
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